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Abstract
We present the first revealed-preference characterizations of the models of exponential
time discounting, quasi-hyperbolic time discounting, and other time-separable models
of consumers’ intertemporal decisions. The characterizations provide non-parametric
revealed-preference tests, which we take to data using the results of a recent experiment
conducted by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). For such data, we find that less than
half the subjects are consistent with exponential discounting, and only a few more are
consistent with quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents an investigation into the observable consequences of the standard
model of exponential discounting, the model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and its
generalizations.
Consider an agent who chooses among dated consumptions of a single good, a good
that one can think of as money. Such agents populate many models in various areas of
economics; for example macroeconomics and finance. One theory is that the agent has
a utility function U(x0, . . . , xT ) for the consumption of xt in each date t. If one is given
data on the choices of our agent, the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP) tells
us whether the choices are consistent with some utility function U that could explain the
data.
Suppose instead that we have a more specific theory in mind. Say that we conjecture
that U takes the form of exponential discounting:
U(x0, . . . , xT ) =
T∑
t=0
δtu(xt).
We term this model EDU for short. What is the version of SARP that allows us to
decide whether data is consistent with such a utility function? The version of the revealed
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1 Introduction
This paper presents an investigation into the observable consequences of the standard model
of exponential discounting, the model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and its generaliza-
tions.
Consider an agent who chooses among dated consumptions of a single good, a good that
one can think of as money. Such agents populate many models in various areas of economics;
for example macroeconomics and finance. One theory is that the agent has a utility function
U(x0, . . . , xT ) for the consumption of xt in each date t. If one is given data on the choices
of our agent, the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP) tells us whether the choices
are consistent with some utility function U that could explain the data.
Suppose instead that we have a more specific theory in mind. Say that we conjecture
that U takes the form of exponential discounting:
U(x0, . . . , xT ) =
T∑
t=0
δtu(xt).
We term this model EDU for short. What is the version of SARP that allows us to decide
whether data is consistent with such a utility function? The version of the revealed preference
axiom that characterizes EDU is obviously going to be stronger than SARP, but the literature
on revealed preferences does not (until now) provide an answer.
We can instead imagine a more general model than exponential discounting, the model
of quasi-hyperbolic discounting (QHD; Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Laibson, 1997):
U(x0, . . . , xT ) = u(x0) + β
T∑
t=1
δtu(xt).
What is the version of SARP that allows us to decide whether data is consistent with quasi-
hyperbolic discounting?
The theoretical contribution of this paper is to provide answers to these questions. We
provide the first revealed-preference characterizations of the models of exponential and quasi-
hyperbolic discounting: defining revealed preference axioms (axioms like SARP, but stronger)
that are satisfied by data if and only if the data is consistent with each of the aforementioned
models.
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Our main result is that a certain revealed preference axiom, termed the “Strong Axiom
of Revealed Exponentially Discounted Utility” (SA-EDU), describes the choice data that
are consistent with convex EDU preferences. SA-EDU builds on the simplest implication of
consumption smoothing on the relation between prices and quantities: that demand slopes
down. The axiom constraints quantities and prices in a way that generalizes downward-
sloping demand, but accounting for the different unobservable components in EDU.
SA-EDU seems like a relatively weak imposition on data, in the sense that it constraints
prices and quantities in those situations in which unobservables do no matter. Essentially,
SA-EDU requires one to consider situations in which unobservables “cancel out”, and check
that the implications of concave utility on prices are not violated.
Aside from EDU, the paper also includes a revealed preference characterization of QHD;
and of more general models, namely time-separable utility, time-dependent discounting, and
minor variations on these models. All of our characterizations are based on ideas similar to
SAR-EDU, building on the implications of consumption smoothing for each of these models.
Building on the theory developed in the paper, we seek to make an empirical contribution
by applying our revealed preference axioms to data from an insightful recent experiment
conducted by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) (hereafter AS). AS’s experimental design fits
our setup very well, and we can apply our tests to their data. The contribution is not only
to show that our axioms are readily applicable and useful, but we also hope to contribute to
the substantive debate on the role of exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
The following is a summary of our findings using the data from Andreoni and Sprenger’s
experiment.
Individual-level pass rates. We check for the consistency of individual subject’s choices
with the various revealed preference axioms. We find that 47% of the subjects are rationaliz-
able using exponential discounting (EDU). Turning to quasi-hyperbolic discounting (QHD),
49% of the subjects are rationalizable using a quasi-hyperbolic functional form for their
utility.
Note that all EDU rationalizable subjects are also QHD rationalizable, so the scope
of QHD is therefore not much more than EDU on this dataset. Only two subjects are
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rationalizable as QHD, but not rationalizable as EDU. In fact, when we look at subjects
who are not rationalizable, their behavior is in some sense as close to EDU as it is to QHD
(see Section 6.2 for the precise meaning of this). So there is some evidence that QHD does
not explain much more than EDU.
Our methodology allows us to go beyond QHD, and establish that 67% of subjects are
consistent with a utility function that is time-separable: the remaining subjects are incon-
sistent with time-separability, although their choices are rationalizable using some utility
function (they satisfy SARP, but this is by design of Andreoni and Sprenger’s experiment).
Section 6 below has more details.
Similarities and differences with AS’s findings. The results from applying our non-
parametric tests correlate well with some of AS’s basic findings, but give a somewhat different
interpretation of others. Very roughly speaking, while AS find moderate support for EDU,
our conclusion is closer to a rejection of EDU.
AS estimate a utility with quasi-hyperbolic discounting: u(x0) + β
∑T
t=1 δ
tu(xt). For
almost all the subjects who pass our test, the AS estimates for β are roughly equal to 1,
indicating exponential (non-hyperbolic) discounting. This means that the two methodologies
have a lot in common, as they detect the same subjects as exponential discounters.
The counterpart of this finding is that the majority of subjects who fail our EDU test
also have estimates of β that differ from 1. This result, however, should be taken with a
grain of salt because most of the subjects who fail the EDU test also fail our test for quasi-
hyperbolic discounting. Therefore a utility function with quasi-hyperbolic discounting could
be considered mispecified.
It is also interesting to note that the estimated values of β (provided by AS) for subjects
who failed our EDU test are symmetrically distributed around 1. The “average” subject
therefore looks, in some sense, as an exponential discounter; even though most agents are
not really consistent with that model. It is possible that AS’s aggregate estimates, which
are supportive of EDU, reflect the behavior of such an average subject.
The role of corner solutions. Among subjects who satisfy our EDU axiom, and are
therefore rationalizable with a utility function with exponential discounting, there is a dis-
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proportionate number of corner solutions. Many of the subjects who are consistent with
the EDU model also make choices at the corners of the budget set. Specifically, they make
choices where they spend all their budget on a reward that is obtained later in time.
This raises a concern, because our test for EDU rationality seems to have lower power at
corner solutions. We ran a simulation of agents that are severely present- or future-biased
quasi-hyperbolic discounters, but that have linear utility. So their choices tend to be at the
corners of the budget set. Basically all the observations in our simulations are consistent
with the EDU revealed preference axiom, and hence would be deemed to be EDU rational.
Of course, a strict application of the philosophy behind revealed preferences would say
that our simulation results do not matter: the agents in our simulation behave as if they
are EDU rational and that is all that is really postulated by EDU as a positive theory of
economic behavior.
This interpretation is a matter of debate, however. We feel that the lack of power is an
interesting, and potentially important, phenomenon when testing for EDU. Some researchers
may conclude that the pass rate of 47% for EDU is really an overestimate, and that in reality
fewer subjects are likely to be EDU rational.
Related literature. There are different behavioral axiomatizations of EDU in the liter-
ature, starting with Koopmans (1960), and followed by Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982),
Fishburn and Edwards (1997), and Bleichrodt et al. (2008). All of them take preferences
as primitive, or in some cases they take utility over consumption streams as the primitive.
The idea is that an analyst can observe all pairwise comparisons of consumption streams,
or that the relevant behavior consists of all pairwise comparisons of consumption streams.
Note that this assumes knowledge of an infinite number of pairwise comparisons: so the
given “dataset” is infinite.
Koopmans (1960) proposes the well-known stationarity axiom, which says a preference is
not affected if a common first consumption is dropped and the timing of all other consump-
tions is advanced by one period. The stationarity axiom is used by many other authors, and
the axiom is used together with the assumption that the set of periods is infinite; indeed it
requires infinite time. Our axiomatization is the first in an environment where agents choose
finite consumption streams.
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In Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982) preferences are defined on one-time consumptions
in continuous time. In Fishburn and Edwards (1997), preferences are defined on infinite
consumption streams that differ in at most finitely many periods. More recently, Bleichrodt
et al. (2008) show that Koopmans (1960)’s axioms imply the boundedness of the utility
function. Then, Bleichrodt et al. (2008) axiomatize the EDU model possibly with unbounded
utility function by using preferences defined on infinite consumption streams.
The quasi-hyperbolic discounting model was first proposed by Phelps and Pollak (1968),
who did not characterize its behavioral consequences. There are several more recent studies
that present a behavioral characterization of QHD, but all take preferences and infinite time
horizons as their primitives, and therefore differ from our results. See Attema et al. (2010)
and Montiel Olea and Strzalecki (forthcoming).
In terms of expenditure data, Browning (1989) gives a revealed-preference axiom for
the EDU model with no discounting (δ = 1). Crawford (2010) investigates intertemporal
consumption and discusses a particular violation from non-separability (TSU), namely habit
formation. Crawford presents Afriat inequalities for the model of habit formation, and uses
Spanish consumption data to carry out the test (see also Crawford and Polisson, 2014).
Blow et al. (2013) present a test for quasi-hyperbolic discounting based on solving Afriat
inequalities. They also apply their model to Spanish consumption data. It is important to
emphasize that these models, starting with Browning (1989) allow for the existence of many
goods in each period; but they do not allow for more than one (intertemporal) purchase for
each agent. The reason is that these authors consider consumption data with one purchase
for each agents (or household) and each period. We have instead assumed that there is only
one good (money) in each period; but we allow for more than one purchase per agent. This
is crucial in order to apply our tests to the experimental data obtained by Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012).
On the empirical side, several approaches have been proposed to identify, estimate, or
calibrate time preferences (see Frederick et al. (2002) for a comprehensive overview of this
literature until the early 21st century). In one strand of the literature, researchers estimate
discount rates using filed data on consumption and credit card borrowings in the context
of a life-cycle consumption model (Cagetti, 2003; Carroll and Samwick, 1997; Gourinchas
and Parker, 2002; Laibson et al., 2003, 2007) or durable goods purchasing (Gately, 1980;
Hausman, 1979). Another strand of the literature involves identification and estimation
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of time preferences using choice data from controlled laboratory experiments. In a typical
experimental paradigm, called the Multiple Price List (MPL) method, participants are asked
to make a series of binary choices between a smaller immediate payment and a larger delayed
payment (Chabris et al., 2008; Coller and Williams, 1999; Harrison et al., 2002; Kirby et al.,
1999). This literature is often subject to the critique that discount rates elicited using MPL
method deviate from those estimated using field data, possibly due to, among other things, an
implicit assumption of linear utility in experimental studies (Frederick et al., 2002). In order
to correct this bias, Andersen et al. (2008) propose the Double Multiple Price List (DMPL)
method, in which two MPLs, each of which is designed to measure time preferences and
risk preferences, are administered. As an alternative solution, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012)
propose the Convex Time Budget (CTB) method, in which participants are asked to choose
from a convex, intertemporal budget set. 1 They find a reasonable level of discount rate and
utility curvature, and evidence in favor of dynamically-consistent time preferences. 2 3
2 Models
For T > 0, we abuse notation and use T to denote the set {0, 1, . . . , T}. In our model, T will
be the (finite) duration of time, and consumption streams will be sequences (x0, . . . , xT ) =
(xt)t∈T ∈ R
T
+. Note that the cardinality of the set T is T + 1, which we do not believe leads
to any confusion. The notation RT means the T + 1 dimensional Euclidean space.
The object of choice in our model is a sequence (xt)t∈T ∈ R
T
+. We assume that an agent
has an income I and faces prices p ∈ RT++; we can think of prices as interest rates.
1Several recent experimental studies use the CTB design both in the laboratory and in the field setting,
including Andreoni et al. (2013b), Augenblick et al. (2013), Barcellos and Carvalho (2014), Carvalho et al.
(2013), Carvalho et al. (2014), and Gine´ et al. (2013).
2Aside from these methodological advances, recent experimental studies call for attention on credit con-
straints and background consumptions in measuring time preferences (Ambrus et al., 2014; Dean and Saut-
mann, 2014). An insightful paper by Halevy (2014) nonparametrically identifies time-consistent, stationary,
and time-invariant choices in recurrent classroom experiments and finds that not only present bias but
time-varying preferences are important driver of time inconsistent choices.
3Relationships between experimentally elicited time preferences (especially present-biasedness) and mea-
sures of real-life economic behavior (e.g., credit card borrowing) and demographic variables (e.g., age, smok-
ing, attitudes to risk) are also of interests (Burks et al., 2012; Dean and Ortoleva, 2014; Meier and Sprenger,
2010, 2013; Tanaka et al., 2010).
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The theories we investigate postulate that an agent solves the problem
max U(x0, . . . , xT )
s.t.
∑
t∈T
ptxt ≤ I
We consider the following classes of utility functions. Let C be the set of all continuous,
concave, and strictly increasing functions u : R+ → R.
1. Time-separable utility : The class TSU of all U that can be written as
U(x0, . . . , xT ) =
∑
t∈T
ut(xt),
for some ut ∈ C for all t ∈ T .
2. General time discounting : The class GTD of all U that can be written as
U(x0, . . . , xT ) =
∑
t∈T
D(t)u(xt),
for some u ∈ C, and a function D : T → R+.
3. Monotone time discounting : The class MTD of all U that can be written as
U(x0, . . . , xT ) =
∑
t∈T
D(t)u(xt),
for some u ∈ C, and a function D : T → R+ that is monotonically decreasing.
4. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting : The class QHD of all U that can be written as
U(x0, . . . , xT ) =
∑
t∈T
D(t)u(xt),
for some u ∈ C, and where
D(t) =

1 if t = 0βδt if t > 0
for some β and δ ∈ (0, 1].
In particular, if β ≤ 1, then U is said to belong to P-QHD of present biased hyperbolic
discounting; and if β ≥ 1, then U is said to belong to F-QHD of future biased hyperbolic
discounting.
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5. Exponential discounting : The class EDU of all U that can be written as
U(x0, . . . , xT ) =
∑
t∈T
δtu(xt),
for some u ∈ C, and some δ ∈ (0, 1].
3 Rationalization
Definition 1. A dataset is a collection (xk, pk)Kk=1, where x
k ∈ RT+ and p
k ∈ RT++.
We have considered seven classes of utility functions U(x0, . . . , xT ). They are: TSU,
GTD, MTD, QHD, P-QHD, F-QHD, and EDU; listed in order of how restrictive they are.
In the following definition, the set M of utility functions can be any of the seven classes
defined above.
Definition 2. A dataset (xk, pk)Kk=1 is M rational if there is a utility function U in the class
M of utilities such that for all k,
pk · y ≤ pk · xk ⇒ U(y) ≤ U(xk)
4 Axioms
Definition 3. A sequence of pairs (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)ni=1 in which
1. xkiti > x
k′
i
t′
i
for all i;
2. each k appears as ki (on the left of the pair) the same number of times it appears as
k′i (on the right):
is a regular sequence.
Remark 1. When K = 1 then (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)ni=1 is regular iff x
ki
ti
> x
k′
i
t′
i
for all i. The K = 1 special
case is relevant for field consumption data (not for the experimental data we have used here),
as one normally observes one intertemporal decision for each agent in such data.
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Strong Axiom of Revealed Time Separable Utility (SA-TSU): For any regular se-
quence of pairs (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)ni=1 in which each ti = t
′
i for all i, the product of prices satisfies
that
n∏
i=1
pkiti
p
k′
i
t′
i
≤ 1.
Strong Axiom of Revealed General Discounted Utility (SA-GTD): For any regular
sequence of pairs (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)ni=1 in which each t appears as ti (on the left of the pair) the same
number of times it appears as t′i (on the right), the product of prices satisfies that
n∏
i=1
pkiti
p
k′
i
t′
i
≤ 1.
Strong Axiom of Revealed Monotonic Time-Varying Discounted Utility (SA-MTD):
For any regular sequence of pairs (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)ni=1 in which there is a permutation pi of {1, 2, . . . , n}
such that ti ≥ t
′
pi(i), the product of prices satisfies that
n∏
i=1
pkiti
p
k′
i
t′
i
≤ 1.
Strong Axiom of Revealed Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounted Utility (SA-QHD): For
any regular sequence of pairs (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)ni=1 in which
1.
∑n
i=1 ti ≥
∑n
i=1 t
′
i;
2. #{i : ti > 0} = #{i : t
′
i > 0};
The product of prices satisfies that
n∏
i=1
pkiti
p
k′
i
t′
i
≤ 1.
Strong Axiom of Revealed Quasi-Hyperbolic Present-Biased Utility (SA-P-QHD):
For any regular sequence of pairs (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)ni=1 in which
1.
∑n
i=1 ti ≥
∑n
i=1 t
′
i;
2. #{i : ti > 0} ≥ #{i : t
′
i > 0};
The product of prices satisfies that
n∏
i=1
pkiti
p
k′
i
t′
i
≤ 1.
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Strong Axiom of Revealed Quasi-Hyperbolic Future-Biased Utility (SA-F-QHD):
For any regular sequence of pairs (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)ni=1 in which
1.
∑n
i=1 ti ≥
∑n
i=1 t
′
i;
2. #{i : ti > 0} ≤ #{i : t
′
i > 0};
The product of prices satisfies that
n∏
i=1
pkiti
p
k′
i
t′
i
≤ 1.
Strong Axiom of Revealed Exponentially Discounted Utility (SA-EDU): For any
regular sequence of pairs (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)ni=1 in which
∑n
i=1 ti ≥
∑n
i=1 t
′
i, the product of prices satis-
fies that
n∏
i=1
pkiti
p
k′
i
t′
i
≤ 1.
Theorem 1. Let (xk, pk)Kk=1 be a dataset. For
M ∈ {TSU, GTD, MTD, QHD, P-QHD, F-QHD, EDU},
the dataset is M-rational iff it satisfies SA-M.
5 A derivation of SA-EDU
Consider the following maximization problem.
maxx∈RT
+
∑
t∈T
δtu(xt)
s.t.
∑
t∈T
ptxt ≤ I,
(1)
For ease of exposition, suppose that the function u is continuously differentiable. The
first-order condition for an interior solution is
δt−1u′(xt) = λpt,
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier. So if a dataset (xk, pk)Kk=1 is EDU rational, the discount
factor δ and utility u must satisfy the above first order condition for each xkt and p
k
t .
10
Suppose that one tries to derive the implications of the first order condition for the
observed quantities and prices. From the first-order conditions, one can obtain that
u′(xk
′
t′ )
u′(xkt )
=
δt
δt′
λk
′
pk
′
t′
λkpkt
.
Suppose that xkt > x
k′
t′ . The concavity of u and x
k
t > x
k′
t′ implies that
δt
δt′
λk
′
pk
′
t′
λkpkt
≤ 1,
but the discount rate δ and the Lagrange multipliers λk
′
and λk are unobservable so we
cannot conclude anything about the observable pk
′
t′ /p
k
t .
There is, however, one implication of EDU and the concavity of u that can unambiguously
be obtained, despite the role of unobservables. We can consider a sequence of pairs (xkt , x
k′
t′ )
chosen such that when we divide first-order conditions as above, all Lagrange multipliers
cancel out, and the effect of the discount factors is unambiguous (even though we do not
know the value of the discount factor). For example, consider
xk1t1 > x
k2
t2
and xk2t3 > x
k1
t4
.
such that
t1 + t3 ≥ t2 + t4.
By manipulating first-order conditions we obtain that:
u′(xk1t1 )
u′(xk2t2 )
·
u′(xk2t3 )
u′(xk1t4 )
=
(
δt2−1
δt1−1
λk1pk1t1
λk2pk2t2
)
·
(
δt4−1
δt3−1
λk2pk2t3
λk1pk1t4
)
= δ(t2+t4)−(t1+t3)
pk1t1
pk2t2
pk2t3
pk1t4
Notice that the pairs (xk1t1 , x
k2
t2
) and (xk2t3 , x
k1
t4
) have been chosen so that the Lagrange mul-
tipliers would cancel out and the discount factors unambiguously increase the value on the
left hand side (i.e., δ(t2+t4)−(t1+t3) ≥ 1 for any δ ∈ (0, 1]).
Now the concavity of u and the assumption that xk1t1 > x
k2
t2
and xk2t3 > x
k1
s4
imply that the
product δ(t2+t4)−(t1+t3)(pk1t1 /p
k2
t2
)(pk2t3 /p
k1
t4
) cannot exceed 1. Since δ(t2+t4)−(t1+t3) ≥ 1 for any
δ ∈ (0, 1], then (pk1t1 /p
k2
t2
)(pk2t3 /p
k1
t4
) cannot exceed 1. Thus, we obtain an implication of EDU
for prices, an observable entity. No matter what the values of the unobservable δ and u, we
find that the ratio of prices cannot be more than 1.
11
In general, the assumption of EDU rationality will require that, for any collection of
sequences as above (appropriately chosen so that Lagrange multipliers will cancel out and
the discount factors unambiguously increase the product of the ratio of prices) the product
of the ratio of prices cannot exceed 1. This idea is captured by the definition of SA-EDU.
6 Empirical Application
6.1 Description of the Data
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) introduce an experimental method called the Convex Time
Budget (CTB) design. In contrast with the “multiple price list method” (Andersen et al.,
2008), subjects in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) are asked to allocate 100 experimental
tokens between “sooner” (time τ) and “later” (time τ + d) accounts.
Tokens allocated to each account have a value of aτ and aτ+d, converting experimental
currency unit into real monetary value for final payments. The gross interest rate over d
days is thus given by 1 + r ≡ aτ+d/aτ . Participants complete 45 decisions: τ ∈ {0, 7, 35}
times d ∈ {35, 70, 98} times 5 questions (4 values of (1 + r), varying across different pairs of
(τ, d); see Figure 1 for an illustration).4
Each participant’s decision in a trial is characterized by a tuple (τ, d, aτ , aτ+d, cτ ): the
first four elements (τ, d, aτ , aτ+d) characterize the budget set she faces in this trial; and cτ is
the number of tokens she decides to allocate to the sooner payment.
In the experiment, participants make a two-period utility maximization problem between
period τ and τ + d:
max U(xτ , xτ+d)
s.t. pτxτ + xτ+d = m.
In order to apply our theoretical framework, we need to imagine that participants are solving
4Note that for a given pair of starting date and delay length (τ, d), 5 budgets are nested as illustrated in
Figure 1. Looking at all 45 budget sets, except for 8 cases in which (aτ , aτ+d) = (0.2, 0.25), aτ+d is fixed at
0.2 and aτ ranges between 0.1 and 0.2. Participants’ choices therefore always satisfy GARP by design.
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Figure 1: An illustration of the CTB design in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). Budget sets are
represented in blue lines, fixing one time frame at (τ, d) = (0, 35).
the problem
max U(x0, . . . xT )
s.t.
T∑
t=0
ptxt = m.
We rewrite the choice data to fit the theoretical framework of Section 3. We set prices
to be pτ = 1 + r = aτ+d/aτ and pτ+d = 1 (normalization); and we define consumptions
(monetary amounts) xτ = cτ · aτ and xτ+d = (100 − cτ ) · aτ+d. We shall implicitly set
the prices of periods that are not offered to be very high, so that agents cannot afford
consumption in those periods.
When participants face a convex budget with (τ, d) = (35, 70) for example, we treat
prices pt for t 6= 30, 75 are “extremely high” and she cannot afford any positive consumption
at dates other than 30 and 30 + 75. In this way, we obtain a dataset (xk, pk)45k=1, x
k ∈ RT+
and pk ∈ RT++, for each of 97 participants in the experiment.
Several features of the AS design make this dataset ideal for our exercise. First and most
importantly (and obviously), the experimental setup is precisely the situation our model tries
to capture: Participants choose how much to consumer from a convex budget set. As we
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briefly mention above, most previous experimental studies on intertemporal decision utilize
an environment with discrete (in many cases, binary) choice sets. A great advantage of
Andreoni and Sprenger’s setup is that they specifically consider choice from convex budgets.
Secondly, every decision in this experiment is a plan: participants made all decisions for
the present and the future at time 0, i.e., while they were in the laboratory. This allows us
to examine the revealed preference axiom for QHD without distinguishing sophisticated and
na¨ıve present-biased preferences (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999a,b). Finally, Andreoni and
Sprenger put a huge effort into equalizing the transaction costs of sooner and later payments,
and minimizing the unwanted effects of uncertainty regarding future payments.
6.2 Results
We start by checking for the consistency of individual participant’s choices with the various
revealed preference axioms.
Recall that the classes of models we examine, EDU, QHD, MTD, GTD, and TSU, can
be ordered by the tightness of the associated axioms. Essentially, we have that:
EDU ⊂ P-QHD ⊂ MTD ⊂ GTD ⊂ TSU,
and that
EDU ⊂ F-QHD ⊂ QHD ⊂ GTD ⊂ TSU,
as QHD is not comparable to MTD.
For this reason, when we find that a subject is EDU rational, she is of course also M
rational for all other models M.
In the sequel, we shall label a participant as “M rational” if her dataset passes the
revealed preference test for model M and “M non-rational” otherwise. We sometimes label
a participant as “strictly M rational” for the most restrictive model M such that the agent
is M rational. For example, a participant is strictly QHD rational if her dataset passes the
QHD test but not the EDU test.
Figure 2 summarizes the results. We find that choice data from 47.4% of 97 participants
(46 participants) are EDU rational. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting utility rationalizes 49.5%
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of the participants: There are only two participants who are strictly QHD rational, and both
of them are in the class P-QHD of present-biased agents.
Sample: 97 participants
EDU: 47.4%
QHD: 49.5%
MTD: 50.5%
GTD: 56.7%
TSU: 67.0% Not TSU: 33.0%
Figure 2: Subjects’ classification into models.
EDU and QHD are arguably the most important models used in economics, but it is
interesting to go beyond these models and look at the more general utility functions described
in Section 2.
We find that 7 additional participants (7.2%) have utility functions with time-varying
discount factor (GTD), and 10 more participants (10.3%) become rational by allowing a more
general, time-separable utility function (TSU). In all, 67% of subjects can be rationalized by
one of the models M.
It is striking that about 33% of participants are not rationalized by any time-separable
utility functions, the most general class of model we are investigating. We cannot say,
however, that those participants are irrational, since GARP is always satisfied in this dataset:
Note that no budget sets in the AS experiment intersect at an interior allocation, although
many budgets share the same corner in which participants receive $20 in the delayed time
periods.
Similarities and differences with AS’s findings. We next revisit AS’s findings and
relate them to results from our nonparametric tests. AS estimate per-period discount factor,
present biasedness, and utility curvature assuming a quasi-hyperbolic discounting u(x0) +
β
∑T
t=1 δ
tu(xt) with a CRRA utility function u(x) = (1/α) · x
α. 5
5AS estimate several model specifications (e.g., assuming CARA instead of CRRA, or incorporating
additional parameters to capture background consumptions), and they also use different estimation methods
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Figure 3: Estimated present-bias parameter for each category of participants.
In the estimation of aggregate preference parameters, AS find no evidence of present
bias (βˆ = 1.007, SE = 0.004; the hypothesis of no present bias, β = 1, is not rejected,
F1,96 = 1.51, p = 0.22). Similarly, at the individual level analysis, AS find that estimated
present bias βˆ’s are narrowly distributed around 1 with median estimate of 1.0011.
In order to compare our non-parametric tests and the AS parametric model estimation,
we use the individual level parameter estimates from AS (see Table A6-7 in Online Appendix
of Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012). 6
Our test is clearly consistent with AS’s estimates: Figure 3 presents the AS-estimated
present bias parameter βˆ for each individual subject, classified by the strictest test passed by
the subject. It is clear in the figure that most of the participants who pass the EDU test have
estimated βˆ almost equal to 1. Those who fail the EDU test but pass QHD, GTD, MTD,
or TSU test tend to have βˆ < 1, and finally, those who do not pass any of the tests have
(e.g., two-limit Tobit model to handle corner choices). In the comparison below, we use their results from
a nonlinear least squares estimation of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and CRRA utility function without
background consumption.
6We obtain parameters for 86 of the 97 subjects. The remaining 11 subjects were excluded from AS’s
analysis, since preference parameters were not estimable. We can run our tests on the 11 excluded subjects:
9 of them pass EDU, and 10 pass QHD.
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estimated βˆ which are far from 1 in magnitude compared to other groups of participants and
are distributed symmetrically around 1. So our test is quite consistent with the procedure
of taking an estimate of β different from one as evidence as violations of EDU .
volve The situation is also illustrated in Figure 4. We classify subjects in two groups,
those who violate and those who satisfy EDU. Panels (A)-(C) present empirical cumulative
distribution functions (CDFs) for the estimated preference parameters in the EDU and non-
EDU rational groups.
Figure 4 shows how, again, our test is clearly consistent with AS’s estimates. Consider
panel (B). The CDF for EDU rational subjects concentrates a large mass at β = 1. The
non-EDU group has no such jump in mass at β = 1, and instead exhibits a substantial
fraction of subjects with estimated β different from 1. The CDF for EDU-rational subjects
is significantly different from the CDF for EDU-non-rational subjects: The null hypothesis
of equality-of-distribution is rejected by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test (p < 0.02). The
point is also brought out more formally by the first row of Table 1.
Figure 4 panel (B) also shows that participants who fail our EDU test have estimates
of β that differ clearly from 1. A quantile regression of the absolute difference between
estimated present bias and 1, |βˆ − 1|, on a dummy variable for EDU rationality (takes 1 if
that participant fails the EDU test) reveals that the median βˆ for EDU rational participants
is not statistically different from 1, while median βˆ for EDU non-rational participants is
significantly different from 1 (Table 2, column 1). Similar quantile regression reveals that
EDU non-rational participants have more heterogeneity in estimated present bias than EDU
rational participants, as evident in the wider inter-quartile range of βˆ (Table 2, column 3).
However, β 6= 1 is not immediately translated into evidence for present or future bias
since. As we have shown above, most of the participants who fail the EDU test also fail our
QHD test (only 2 additional participants pass the test for P-QHD, and most of the subjects
who failed EDU even fail MTD). In this sense, the interpretation of estimated β for non-EDU
subjects in Figure 4 panel (B) requires some caution. The model is arguably mispecified for
such subjects.
One of the advantages of our revealed preference tests is that we can go beyond the class
of QHD utility function by weakening the restrictions in the relevant revealed preference
axioms.
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Figure 4: Empirical CDFs for preference parameters and properties of choices.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of AS estimate for present bias β for each class of participants.
Sample Percentile Inter-quartile
Class size 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th range
EDU 37 0.938 0.999 1.001 1.001 1.015 0.0025
non EDU, TSU 18 0.768 0.971 0.993 1.003 1.078 0.0313
non TSU 31 0.904 0.959 1.003 1.042 1.138 0.0829
All sample 86 0.912 0.975 1.001 1.007 1.112 0.0318
Table 1 gives us this information in a different way. The median βˆ’s are within 5× 10−3
radius around 1 for all three groups, but inter-quartile range for each group is nicely ordered
(see Table 2, column 4).
Consider Figure 3 again. It is interesting to note that the estimated values of βˆ for
participants who fail our EDU test are symmetrically distributed around 1. 7 The “average”
participant looks, in some sense, as an EDU agent, even though the majority of subjects
are not consistent with that model according to our test. It is therefore possible that AS’s
finding in favor of EDU in their aggregate preference estimation reflects the choice behavior
of such an average participant.
The role of corner solutions. Next we look into subjects’ choice patterns, and investigate
their relationship with our test results.
For each participant, we calculate the proportions (out of 45 choices) of (i) interior
allocations, (ii) corner allocations in which participants spend all her budget on a reward
that is obtained later in time (called “all tokens later”), and (iii) corner allocations in which
participants spend all her budget on a reward that is obtained sooner in time (called “all
tokens sooner”).
Figure 4 panels (D)-(F) present empirical CDFs of proportions of those three types of
choices for subjects who pass our EDU test, and subjects who fail our EDU test. We observe
7We test symmetry using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. We first sort estimated βˆ in an ascending order,
calculate |βˆ − 1|, and split them into the first half (smaller βˆ) and the last half (larger βˆ). We apply K-S
test for equality of distribution for those two empirical distributions of |βˆ − 1|. The null hypothesis of equal
distribution is not rejected (p = 0.609).
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Table 2: Estimated present bias and class of rationality.
Independent var. (1) (2) (3) (4)
nonEDU 0.032 *** 0.063 ***
(0.004) (0.016)
TSU\EDU 0.023 *** 0.029
(0.002) (0.028)
nonTSU 0.039 *** 0.080 **
(0.002) (0.024)
Constant 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.001) (0.009) (0.008)
Pseudo R2 0.148 0.163
0.75 pseudo R2 0.073 0.095
0.25 pseudo R2 0.043 0.046
# Obs. 86 86 86 86
Notes: Columns 1 and 2: Quantile regression (median) of |βˆ − 1| on dummy variables. Columns 3
and 4: Interquartile regression of βˆ on dummy variables. nonEDU is a dummy for participants who
fail the EDU test, TSU\EDU is a dummy for those who fail the EDU test but pass the TSU test,
and nonTSU is a dummy for those who pass the TSU test. Level of significance. ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01,
∗∗ : p < 0.05, ∗ : p < 0.10.
that more than 70% of the participants who pass our EDU test never made interior allocations
during the experiment and frequently chose to allocate all tokens to the later payments. 8 9
This point is made more clear in Figure 5, which presents each participant’s choice pattern
sorted by results of our EDU and TSU tests. The fraction of interior allocations increases
by moving from EDU participants (21.7% of them made at least one interior allocation) to
strictly TSU rational participants (all of them made at least one interior allocation); and it
increases further when we look at subjects who fail the TSU test (all of them made at least
8The null hypothesis of equal distribution is rejected by K-S test for all three cases: interior allocations,
p < 10−14; “all later”, p < 10−13; “all sooner”, p < 0.04.
9Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) already remark on the incidence of of corner choices, and comment on
how this phenomenon may suggest that the curvature of utility is close to linear.
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Figure 5: Individual choice patterns and class of rationality.
one interior allocation, and 15.6% of them chose interior allocations in all trials).1011
The high incidence of corner solutions raises a concern. We suspect that the test for
EDU rationality may have low power when one considers corner solutions. The (admittedly
vague) intuition for this is that subjects’ first-order conditions need to be satisfied with an
inequality at a corner solution (the Kuhn-Tucker condition for optimality), while it needs
to be satisfied with equality for an interior solution. We ran a simulation to assess the
possibility of lower power when facing data with many corner solutions.
Assuming the same utility function in AS, we generate choice data of synthetic subjects
who are present- or future- biased but have linear utility. Their choices therefore tend to be
at the corners of the budget sets. Applying our revealed preference test to those dataset, we
find all of the simulated observations are consistent with the revealed preference axiom for
EDU.
We note that aﬄuence of corner choices is the typical pattern observed in recent studies
using the CTB method. For example, Augenblick et al. (2013) observe that 86% of monetary
10These observations are consistent with the fact that AS estimate for utility curvature αˆ is roughly equal
to 1 (linear utility) for EDU group (Figure 4 panel (A)).
11We find in Figure 4 panel (B) and Figure 5 that many EDU rational participants have estimated β close
to 1. Those participants made the same choice pattern: they allocated all tokens to later payment in all but
one trial, in which 1 + r = 1. They allocated all tokens to the sooner payment in that particular trial.
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Table 3: Power measures.
Sampling EDU P-QHD F-QHD QHD MTD GTD TSU
Uniform random 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Simple Bootstrap 0.10 0.12 0.18 0.20 0.56 2.76 12.55
allocations are corner solutions and 61% of subjects have no interior allocations in twenty
decisions in monetary discounting task and similarly, 31% of allocations are at corners and
only 1 participant has zero interior allocations in effort discounting task. In a field setting,
Gine´ et al. (2013) observe between 12% to 23% of corner choices under varying delay length
and rate of returns. Finally, in Andreoni et al.’s (2013b) restricted CTB experiment, 87% of
choices are at corners and 58% of participants have no interior allocations.
General power of the tests. It is well known that some tests in revealed preference
theory tend to have low power. The low power of SARP (or GARP) is well documented. As
a result, it is common (see the discussion in Andreoni et al., 2013a) to assess the power of a
test by comparing the pass rates from purely random data. Here we report the results from
such an assessment using our tests and the experimental design of AS. We find no evidence
of low power.
We generate 10,000 datasets in which choices are made at random and uniformly dis-
tributed on the frontier of the budget set (Method 1 of Bronars, 1987). Datasets generated
in this way always fail our tests (Table 3). Next, we apply the simple bootstrap method. For
each of 45 budget sets, we randomly pick one choice from the set of choices observed in the
entire experiment (i.e., 97 observations for each budget). We generate 10,000 such datasets
and apply our revealed preference tests. We again observe high percentages of violation.
The results do not indicate a problem with power in general (but see our remarks on corner
choices). The (admittedly crude) procedure of comparing pass rates of random choices do
not indicate that it is easy for manifestly irrational choices to pass our tests.
Distance measure. We find that many participants’ choices in the AS experiment are
inconsistent with EDU, QHD, and even the TSU model. A natural question is then “how
far” are these datasets from EDU, QHD, or TSU rationality. Is a participant’s data not
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explained by EDU model because of his/her single mistake in the experiment? Or is it
because of a totally inconsistent behavior?
To answer these questions we quantify the distance of the dataset from rationality by
finding the largest subset of the dataset that passes the test under consideration. 12 More
precisely, we take the following steps. For each EDU non-rational (similarly for QHD and
TSU) participant’s dataset: (i) We randomly drop one observation from the dataset; (ii)
We implement the EDU test. If the dataset is EDU rational, we stop here. Otherwise, we
drop another observation randomly and test EDU rationality again; and (iii) We repeat this
procedure until the subset becomes EDU rational.
Ideally, one would consider dropping all possible subsets of data, but such a calculation
is obviously computationally infeasible. Our approach of sequentially choosing (at random)
one observation to drop is a rough approximation of the ideal measure. In particular, the
conclusion can depend on the particular sequence chosen. To address this problem we iterate
the process 1, 000 times for each EDU non-rational participant. Let nm be the number of
observations required to be dropped from the original dataset to make the subdata EDU
rational, in the m-th iteration. We define the distance of the dataset from EDU rationality
by d′EDU = min{n1, . . . , n1000}/45. By definition, the measure is between 0 and 1, and the
smaller d′EDU is the closer the dataset to be EDU rational. We also note that the measure
is an “upper bound” of the distance we want to capture, due to random nature and path-
dependence of our approach. 13
Figure 6 shows empirical CDFs of d′EDU along with d
′
QHD and d
′
TSU, calculated in the
similar manner. Note that sample size is different for each line: d′EDU is calculated for 51
EDU non-rational participants, d′QHD is calculated for 49 QHD non-rational participants,
and d′EDU is calculated for 32 TSU non-rational participants. We find that the median
d′TSU is 0.089. implying that half of the 32 TSU non-rational participants become TSU
rational by dropping 9% of the observations. For EDU and QHD, on the other hand, more
12This approach is motivated by a measure proposed by Houtman and Maks (1985), which is based on
finding the largest subset of observations that is consistent with GARP.
13We should observe d′EDU ≥ d
′
QHD ≥ d
′
TSU as a logical consequence (if the subset of data, after dropping
n observations, is EDU rational, then the same subset is QHD rational, and so on). In reality, however, due
to sample variation in the stochastic algorithm we use to compute distances, we observe several instances in
which d′EDU < d
′
QHD (or d
′
EDU < d
′
TSU). We correct for this by simply replacing d
′
QHD with d
′
EDU (similarly,
d′TSU with d
′
EDU) whenever such violations are observed.
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observations need to be dropped to rationalize the data: median d′EDU and d
′
QHD are 0.356
and 0.333, respectively. We also find that the distributions of d′EDU and d
′
QHD are almost
indistinguishable.
In Figure 7 we see a significant positive correlation (Pearson’s correlation coefficient
ρ = 0.7687, p < 10−10) between the proportion of interior allocations and the distance to
EDU rationality. This correlation is in line with our speculation that the aﬄuence of corner
allocations make our revealed preference tests less demanding.
7 Proof of Theorem 1
We present the proof of the equivalence between EDU rationality and SA-EDU rationality.
Except for the equivalence between TSU and SA-TSU, the proof of the remaining claims
in Theorem 1 is similar. We comment on how the proof for EDU needs to be modified to
obtain each of the remaining claims.
8 Proof of Theorem 1 (i)
The proof is based on using the first-order conditions for maximizing a utility with the EDU
model over a budget set. Our first lemma ensures that we can without loss of generality
restrict attention to first order conditions. The proof of the lemma is the same as that of
Lemma 3 in Echenique and Saito (2013a) with the changes of T to S and {δt}t∈T to {µs}s∈S.
We use the following notation in the proofs:
X = {xkt : k = 1, . . . , K, t = 0, . . . , T}.
Lemma 1. Let (xk, pk)Kk=1 be a dataset. The following statements are equivalent:
1. (xk, pk)Kk=1 is EDU rational.
2. There are strictly positive numbers vkt , λ
k, and δ ∈ (0, 1], for t = 1, . . . , T and k =
1, . . . , K, such that
δtvkt = λ
kpkt
xkt > x
k′
t′ ⇒ v
k
t ≤ v
k′
t′ .
25
Proof. We shall prove that (1) implies (2). Let (xk, pk)Kk=1 be EDU rational. Let δ ∈ (0, 1]
and u : R+ → R be as in the definition of EDU rational data. Then (see, for example,
Theorem 28.3 of Rockafellar (1997)), there are numbers λk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , K such that if
we let
vkt =
λkpkt
δt
then vkt ∈ ∂u(x
k
t ) if x
k
t > 0, and there is w ∈ ∂u(x
k
t ) with v
k
t ≥ w if x
k
t = 0. In fact, it is easy
to see that λk > 0, and therefore vkt > 0.
By the concavity of u, and the consequent monotonicity of ∂u(xkt ) (see Theorem 24.8
of Rockafellar (1997)), if xkt > x
k′
t′ > 0, v
k
t ∈ ∂u(x
k
t ), and v
k′
t′ ∈ ∂u(x
k′
t′ ), then v
k
t ≤ v
k′
t′ . If
xkt > x
k′
t′ = 0, then w ∈ ∂u(x
k′
t′ ) with v
k′
t′ ≥ w. So v
k
t ≤ w ≤ v
k′
t′ .
In second place, we show that (2) implies (1). Suppose that the numbers vkt , λ
k, δ, for
t ∈ T and k ∈ K, are as in (2).
Enumerate the elements in X in increasing order:
y1 < y2 < . . . < yn
Let
y
i
= min{vkt : x
k
t = yi} and y¯i = max{v
k
t : x
k
t = yi}.
Let zi = (yi + yi+1)/2, i = 1, . . . , n− 1; z0 = 0, and zn = yn + 1. Let f be a correspondence
defined as follows:
f(z) =


[y
i
, y¯i] if z = yi,
max{y¯i : z < yi} if yn > z and ∀i(z 6= yi),
y
n
/2 if yn < z.
By assumption of the numbers vkt , we have that, when y < y
′, v ∈ f(y) and v′ ∈ f(y′), then
v ≤ v′. Then the correspondence f is monotone and there is a concave function u for which
∂u = f (Theorem 24.8 of Rockafellar (1997)). Given that vkt > 0 all the elements in the
range of f are positive, and therefore u is strictly increasing.
Finally, for all (k, t), λkpkt /δ
t = vkt ∈ ∂u(v
k
t ) and therefore the first-order conditions to a
maximum choice of x hold at xkt . Since u is concave the first-order conditions are sufficient.
The data is therefore EDU rational.
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8.1 Necessity
Lemma 2. If a dataset (xk, pk)Kk=1 is EDU rational, then it satisfies SA-EDU.
Proof. Let (xk, pk)Kk=1 be EDU rational, and let δ ∈ (0, 1] and u : R+ → R be as in the
definition of EDU rational. By Lemma 1, there exists a strictly positive solution vkt , λ
k, δ to
the system in Statement (2) of Lemma 1 with vkt ∈ ∂u(x
k
t ) when x
k
t > 0, and v
k
t ≥ w ∈ ∂u(x
k
t )
when xkt = 0.
Let (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)ni=1 be a sequence satisfying the three conditions in SA-EDU. Then x
ki
ti
> x
k′
i
t′
i
.
Suppose that x
k′
i
t′
i
> 0. Then, vkiti ∈ ∂u(x
ki
ti
) and v
k′
i
t′
i
∈ ∂u(x
k′
i
t′
i
). By the concavity of u, it
follows that λkiδt
′
ipkiti ≤ λ
k′
iδtip
k′
i
t′
i
(see Theorem 24.8 of Rockafellar (1997)). Similarly, if
x
k′
i
t′
i
= 0, then vkiti ∈ ∂u(x
ki
ti
) and v
k′
i
t′
i
≥ w ∈ ∂u(x
k′
i
t′
i
). So λkiδt
′
ipkiti ≤ λ
k′
iδtip
k′
i
t′
i
Therefore,
1 ≥
n∏
i=1
λkiδt
′
ipkiti
λk
′
iδtip
k′
i
t′
i
=
1
δ(
∑
ti−
∑
t′
i
)
n∏
i=1
pkiti
p
k′
i
t′
i
≥
n∏
i=1
pkiti
p
k′
i
t′
i
,
as the sequence satisfies (2) and (3) of SA-EDU; and hence
∑
ti ≥
∑
t′i and the numbers λ
k
appear the same number of times in the denominator as in the numerator of this product.
8.2 Theorem of Alternatives
To prove the sufficiency, we shall use the following lemma, which is a version of the Theorem
of the Alternative. This is Theorem 1.6.1 in Stoer and Witzgall (1970). We shall use it here
in the cases where F is either the real or the rational numbers.
Lemma 3. Let A be an m × n matrix, B be an l × n matrix, and E be an r × n matrix.
Suppose that the entries of the matrices A, B, and E belong the a commutative ordered field
F. Exactly one of the following alternatives is true.
1. There is u ∈ Fn such that A · u = 0, B · u ≥ 0, E · u≫ 0.
2. There is θ ∈ Fr, η ∈ Fl, and pi ∈ Fm such that θ · A + η · B + pi · E = 0; pi > 0 and
η ≥ 0.
We also use the following lemma, which follows from Lemma 3 (See Border (2013) or
Chambers and Echenique (2014)):
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Lemma 4. Let A be an m × n matrix, B be an l × n matrix, and E be an r × n matrix.
Suppose that the entries of the matrices A, B, and E are rational numbers. Exactly one of
the following alternatives is true.
1. There is u ∈ Rn such that A · u = 0, B · u ≥ 0, and E · u≫ 0.
2. There is θ ∈ Qr, η ∈ Ql, and pi ∈ Qm such that θ · A + η · B + pi · E = 0; pi > 0 and
η ≥ 0.
8.3 Sufficiency
We proceed to prove the sufficiency direction. Sufficiency follows from the following lemmas
as in Echenique and Saito (2013a).
We know from Lemma 1 that it suffices to find a solution to the first order conditions.
Lemma 5 establishes that SA-EDU is sufficient when the logarithms of the prices are rational
numbers. The role of rational logarithms comes from our use of a version of Farkas’s Lemma.
Lemma 6 says that we can approximate any data satisfying SA-EDU with a dataset for which
the logs of prices are rational and for which SA-EDU is satisfied. Finally, Lemma 7 establishes
the result. It is worth mentioning that we cannot use Lemma 6 and an approximate solution
to obtain a limiting solution.
Lemma 5. Let data (xk, pk)kk=1 satisfy SA-EDU. Suppose that log(p
k
t ) ∈ Q for all k and t.
Then there are numbers vkt , λ
k, δ, for t ∈ T and k = 1, . . . , K satisfying (2) in Lemma 1.
Lemma 6. Let data (xk, pk)kk=1 satisfy SA-EDU. Then for all positive numbers ε, there exists
qkt ∈ [p
k
t − ε, p
k
t ] for all t ∈ T and k ∈ K such that log q
k
t ∈ Q and the dataset (x
k, qk)kk=1
satisfy SA-EDU.
Lemma 7. Let data (xk, pk)kk=1 satisfy SA-EDU. Then there are numbers v
k
t , λ
k, δ, for t ∈ T
and k = 1, . . . , K satisfying (2) in Lemma 1.
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8.4 Proof of Lemma 5
We linearize the equation in System (2) of Lemma 1. The result is:
log v(xkt ) + t log δ − log λ
k − log pkt = 0, (2)
x > x′ ⇒ log v(x′) ≥ log v(x), (3)
log δ ≤ 0. (4)
In the system comprised by (2), (3), and (4), the unknowns are the real numbers log vkt ,
log δ, k ∈ K and t ∈ T .
First, we are going to write the system of inequalities (2) and (3) in matrix form.
A system of linear inequalities
We shall define a matrix A such that there are positive numbers vkt , λ
k, δ the logs of
which satisfy Equation (2) if and only if there is a solution u ∈ RK×(T+1)+1+K+1 to the
system of equations
A · u = 0,
and for which the last component of u is strictly positive.
Let A be a matrix with K × (T + 1) + 1 +K + 1 columns, defined as follows: We have
one row for every pair (k, t) such that xkt > 0; one column for every pair (k, t); one column
for each k; and two additional columns. Organize the columns so that we first have the
K × (T + 1) columns for the pairs (k, t); then one of the single columns mentioned in last
place, which we shall refer to as the δ-column; then K columns (one for each k); and finally
one last column. In the row corresponding to (k, t) the matrix has zeroes everywhere with
the following exceptions: it has a 1 in the column for (k, t); it has a t in the δ column; it has
a −1 in the column for k; and − log pkt in the very last column.
Thus, matrix A looks as follows:


(1,0) ··· (k,t) ··· (K,T ) δ 1 ··· k ··· K p
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
(k,t) 0 · · · 1 · · · 0 t 0 · · · −1 · · · 0 − log pkt
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...


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Consider the system A · u = 0. If there are numbers solving Equation (2), then these
define a solution u ∈ RK×(T+1)+1+K+1 for which the last component is 1. If, on the other
hand, there is a solution u ∈ RK×(T+1)+1+K+1 to the system A · u = 0 in which the last
component is strictly positive, then by dividing through by the last component of u we
obtain numbers that solve Equation (2).
In second place, we write the system of inequalities (3) in matrix form. Let B be a
matrix B with K × (T + 1) + 1 +K + 1 columns. Define B as follows: One row for every
pair (k, t) and (k′, t′) with xkt > x
k′
t′ ; in the row corresponding to (k, t) and (k
′, t′) we have
zeroes everywhere with the exception of a −1 in the column for (k, t) and a 1 in the column
for (k′, t′) . Finally, in the last row, we have zero everywhere with the exception of a −1 at
K × (T + 1) + 1th column. We shall refer to this last row as the δ-row.
In third place, we have a matrix E that captures the requirement that the last component
of a solution be strictly positive. The matrix E has a single row and K× (T +1)+1+K+1
columns. It has zeroes everywhere except for 1 in the last column.
To sum up, there is a solution to system (2), (3) and (4) if and only if there is a vector
u ∈ RK×(T+1)+1+K+1 that solves the system of equations and linear inequalities
S1 :


A · u = 0,
B · u ≥ 0,
E · u≫ 0.
Theorem of the Alternative
The entries of A, B, and E are integer numbers, with the exception of the last column of
A. Under the hypothesis of the lemma we are proving, the last column consists of rational
numbers.
By Lemma 4, then, there is such a solution u to S1 if and only if there is no rational
vector (θ, η, pi) that solves the system of equations and linear inequalities
S2 :


θ · A+ η ·B + pi · E = 0,
η ≥ 0,
pi > 0.
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In the following, we shall prove that the non-existence of a solution u implies that the
data must violate SA-EDU. Suppose then that there is no solution u and let (θ, η, pi) be a
rational vector as above, solving system S2.
By multiplying (θ, η, pi) by any positive integer we obtain new vectors that solve S2, so
we can take (θ, η, pi) to be integer vectors.
Henceforth, we use the following notational convention: For a matrix D with K × (T +
1) + 1 + K + 1 columns, write D1 for the submatrix of D corresponding to the first K ×
(T + 1) columns; let D2 be the submatrix corresponding to the following one column (i.e.,
δ-column); D3 correspond to the next K columns; and D4 to the last column. Thus, D =
[D1 D2 D3 D4 ].
Claim 1. (i) θ·A1+η ·B1 = 0; (ii) θ·A2+η ·B2 = 0; (iii) θ·A3 = 0; and (iv) θ·A4+pi ·E4 = 0.
Proof. Since θ · A + η · B + pi · E = 0, then θ · Ai + η · Bi + pi · Ei = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , 4.
Moreover, since B3, B4, E1, E2, and E3 are zero matrices, we obtain the claim. 
For convenience, we transform the matrices A and B using θ and η.
Transform the matrices A, and B
Lets define a matrix A∗ from A by letting A∗ have K× (T +1)+1+K +1 columns that
consists of the rows as follows: for each row in r ∈ A
1. θr copies of the rth row when θr > 0;
2. omitting row r when θr = 0;
3. θr copies of the rth row multiplied by −1 when θr < 0.
We refer to rows that are copies of some r in A with θr > 0 as original rows. We refer
to rows that are copies of some r in A with θr < 0 as converted rows.
Similarly, we define the matrix B∗ from B by including the same columns as B and ηr
copies of each row (and thus omitting row r when ηr = 0; recall that ηr ≥ 0 for all r).
Claim 2. For any (k, t), all the entries in the column for (k, t) in A∗1 are of the same sign.
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Proof. By definition of A, the column for (k, t) will have zero in all its entries with the
exception of the row for (k, t). In A∗, for each (k, t), there are three mutually exclusive
possibilities: the row for (k, t) in A can (i) not appear in A∗, (ii) it can appear as original,
or (iii) it can appear as converted. This shows the claim.
Claim 3. There exists a sequence of pairs (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)n
∗
i=1 that satisfies (1) in SA-EDU.
Proof. We define such a sequence by induction. Let B1 = B∗. Given Bi, define Bi+1 as
follows.
Denote by >i the binary relation on X defined by z >i z′ if z > z′ and there is at least
one pair (k, t) and (k′, t′) for which (i) xkt > x
k′
t′ ; (ii) z = x
k
t and z
′ = xk
′
t′ ; and (iii) the row
corresponding xkt > x
k′
t′ in B has strictly positive weight in η.
The binary relation >i cannot exhibit cycles because >i⊆>. There is therefore at least
one sequence zi1, . . . z
i
Li
in X such that zij >
i zij+1 for all j = 1, . . . , Li − 1 and with the
property that there is no z ∈ X with z >i zi1 or z
i
Li
>i z.
Let the matrix Bi+1 be defined as the matrix obtained from Bi by omitting one copy of
the row corresponding to zij > z
i
j+1, for all j = 1, . . . Li − 1.
The matrix Bi+1 has strictly fewer rows than Bi. There is therefore n∗ for which Bn
∗+1
either has no more rows, or Bn
∗+1
1 has only zeroes in all its entries (its rows are copies of the
δ-row which has only zeroes in its first K × (T + 1) columns).
Define a sequence of pairs (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)n
∗
i=1 by letting x
ki
ti
= zi1 and x
k′
i
t′
i
= ziLi . Note that, as a
result, xkiti > x
k′
i
t′
i
for all i. Therefore the sequence of pairs (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)n
∗
i=1 satisfies condition (1)
in SA-EDU. 
We shall use the sequence of pairs (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)n
∗
i=1 as our candidate violation of SA-EDU.
Consider a sequence of matrices Ai, i = 1, . . . , n∗ defined as follows. Let A1 = A∗,
B1 = B∗, and
C1 =
[
A1
B1
]
.
Observe that the rows of C1 add to the null vector by Claim 9.
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We shall proceed by induction. Suppose that Ai has been defined, and that the rows of
C i =
[
Ai
Bi
]
add to the null vector.
Recall the definition of the sequence
xkiti = z
i
1 > . . . > z
i
Li
= x
k′
i
t′
i
.
There is no z ∈ X with z >i zi1 or z
i
Li
>i z, so in order for the rows of C i to add to zero
there must be a −1 in Ai1 in the column corresponding to (k
′
i, t
′
i) and a 1 in A
i
1 in the column
corresponding to (ki, ti). Let ri be a row in A
i corresponding to (ki, ti), and r
′
i be a row
corresponding to (k′i, t
′
i). The existence of a −1 in A
i
1 in the column corresponding to (k
′
i, t
′
i),
and a 1 in Ai1 in the column corresponding to (ki, ti), ensures that ri and r
′
i exist. Note that
the row r′i is a converted row while ri is original. Let A
i+1 be defined from Ai by deleting
the two rows, ri and r
′
i.
Claim 4. The sum of ri, r
′
i, and the rows of B
i which are deleted when forming Bi+1
(corresponding to the pairs zij > z
i
j+1, j = 1, . . . , Li − 1) add to the null vector.
Proof. Recall that zij >
i zij+1 for all j = 1, . . . , Li− 1. So when we add the rows correspond-
ing to zij >
i zij+1 and z
i
j+1 >
i zij+2, then the entries in the column for (k, t) with x
k
t = z
i
j+1
cancel out and the sum is zero in that entry. Thus, when we add the rows of Bi that are
not in Bi+1 we obtain a vector that is 0 everywhere except the columns corresponding to zi1
and ziLi . This vector cancels out with ri + r
′
i, by definition of ri and r
′
i. 
Claim 5. The matrix A∗ can be partitioned into pairs of rows as follows:
A∗ =


r1
r′1
...
ri
r′i
...
rn∗
r′n∗ ,


in which the rows r′i are converted and the rows ri are original.
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Proof. For each i, Ai+1 differs from Ai in that the rows ri and r
′
i are removed from A
i to
form Ai+1. We shall prove that A∗ is composed of the 2n∗ rows ri, r
′
i.
First note that since the rows of C i add up to the null vector, and Ai+1 and Bi+1 are
obtained from Ai and Bi by removing a collection of rows that add up to zero, then the rows
of C i+1 must add up to zero as well.
By way of contradiction, suppose that there exist rows left after removing rn∗ and r
′
n∗ .
Then, by the argument above, the rows of the matrix Cn
∗+1 must add to the null vector. If
there are rows left, then the matrix Cn
∗+1 is well defined.
By definition of the sequence Bi, however, Bn
∗+1 has all its entries equal to zero, or has
no rows. Hence, the rows remaining in An
∗+1
1 must add up to zero. By Claim 10, the entries
of a column (k, t) of A∗ are always of the same sign. Moreover, each row of A∗ has a non-zero
element in the first K × S columns. Therefore, no subset of the columns of A∗1 can sum to
the null vector. 
Claim 6. (i) For any k and t, if (ki, ti) = (k, t) for some i, then the row ri corresponding
to (k, t) appears as original in A∗. Similarly, if (k′i, t
′
i) = (k
′, t′) for some i, then the row
corresponding to (k, t) appears converted in A∗.
(ii) If the row corresponding to (k, t) appears as original in A∗, then there is some i with
(ki, ti) = (k, t). Similarly, if the row corresponding to (k, t) appears converted in A
∗, then
there is i with (k′i, t
′
i) = (k, t).
Proof. (i) is true by definition of (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
). (ii) is immediate from Claim 13 because if the
row corresponding to (k, t) appears original in A∗ then it equals ri for some i, and then
xkt = x
ki
ti
. Similarly when the row appears converted. 
Claim 7. The sequence (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)n
∗
i=1 satisfies (2) and (3) in SA-EDU.
Proof. We first establish (2). Note that A∗2 is a vector, and in row r the entry of A
∗
2 is as
follows. There must be a (k, t) of which r is a copy. Then the component at row r of A∗2 is
t if r is original and −t if r is converted. Now, when r appears as original there is some i
for which t = ti, when r appears as converted there is some i for which t = t
′
i. So for each r
there is i such that (A∗4)r is either ti or −t
′
i. By Claim 9 (ii), θ ·A2 + η ·B2 = 0. Recall that
θ ·A2 equals the sum of the rows of A
∗
2. Moreover, B2 is a vector that has zeroes everywhere
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except a −1 in the δ row (i.e., K × (T + 1) + 1th row). Therefore, the sum of the rows of
A∗2 equals ηK×(T+1)+1, where ηK×(T+1)+1 is the K × (T + 1) + 1th element of η. Since η ≥ 0,
therefore,
∑n∗
i=1 ti ≥
∑n∗
i=1 t
′
i, and condition (2) in the axiom is satisfied.
Now we turn to (3). By Claim 9 (iii), the rows of A∗3 add up to zero. Therefore, the num-
ber of times that k appears in an original row equals the number of times that it appears in
a converted row. By Claim 14, then, the number of times k appears as ki equals the number
of times it appears as k′i. Therefore condition (3) in the axiom is satisfied. 
Finally, in the following, we show that
n∗∏
i=1
pkiti
p
k′
i
t′
i
> 1,
which finishes the proof of Lemma 5 as the sequence (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)n
∗
i=1 would then exhibit a
violation of SA-EDU.
Claim 8.
∏n∗
i=1
p
ki
ti
p
k′
i
t′
i
> 1.
Proof. By Claim 9 (iv) and the fact that the submatrix E4 equals the scalar 1, we obtain
0 = θ · A4 + piE4 = (
n∗∑
i=1
(ri + r
′
i))4 + pi,
where (
∑n∗
i=1(ri+r
′
i))4 is the (scalar) sum of the entries of A
∗
4. Recall that − log p
ki
ti
is the last
entry of row ri and that log p
k′
i
t′
i
is the last entry of row r′i, as r
′
i is converted and ri original.
Therefore the sum of the rows of A∗4 are
∑n∗
i=1 log(p
k′
i
t′
i
/pkiti ). Then,
n∗∑
i=1
log(p
k′
i
t′
i
/pkiti ) = −pi < 0.
Thus
n∗∏
i=1
pkiti
p
k′
i
t′
i
> 1.

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8.5 Proof of Lemma 6
For each sequence σ = (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)ni=1, we shall identify the pair (x
ki
ti
, x
k′
i
t′
i
) with ((ki, ti), (k
′
i, t
′
i)).
For each sequence σ = (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)ni=1 that satisfies conditions (1), (2), and (3) in SA-EDU,
we define a vector tσ ∈ N
K2T 2 . Let tσ((k, t), (k
′, t′)) be the number of times that the pair
(xkt , x
k′
t′ ) appears in the sequence σ. One can then describe the satisfaction of SA-EDU by
means of the vectors tσ. Define
T =
{
tσ ∈ N
K2T 2|σ satisfies (1), (2), (3) in SA-EDU
}
.
Observe that the set T depends only on (xk)Kk=1 in the dataset (x
k, pk)Kk=1. It does not depend
on prices.
For each ((k, t), (k′, t′)) such that xkt > x
k′
t′ , define
βˆ((k, t), (k′, t′)) = log
(
pkt
pk
′
t′
)
.
And define βˆ((k, t), (k′, t′)) = 0 when xkt ≤ x
k′
t′ . Then, βˆ is a K
2T 2-dimensional real-valued
vector.
If σ = (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)ni=1, then
βˆ · tσ =
∑
((k,t),(k′,t′))
βˆ((k, t), (k′, t′))tσ((k, t), (k
′, t′)) = log
( n∏
i=1
pkiti
p
k′
i
t′
i
)
.
So the data satisfy SA-EDU if and only if t · γˆ ≤ 0 for all t ∈ T .
Enumerate the elements in X in increasing order:
y1 < y2 < · · · < yN .
Fix an arbitrary ξ ∈ (0, 1).
We shall construct by induction a sequence (εkt (n)) for n = 1, . . . , N , where ε
k
t (n) is
defined for all (k, t) with xkt = yn.
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By the denseness of the rational numbers, and the continuity of the exponential function,
for each (k, t) such that xkt = y1, there exists a positive number ε
k
t (1) such that log(p
k
t ε
k
t (1)) ∈
Q and ξ < εkt (1) < 1. Let ε(1) = min{ε
k
t (1)|x
k
t = y1}.
In second place, for each (k, t) such that xkt = y2, there exists a positive ε
k
t (2) such that
log(pkt ε
k
t (2)) ∈ Q and ξ < ε
k
t (2) < ε(1). Let ε(2) = min{ε
k
t (2)|x
k
t = y2}.
In third place, and reasoning by induction, suppose that ε(n) has been defined and that
ξ < ε(n). For each (k, t) such that xkt = yn+1, let ε
k
t (n+1) > 0 be such that log(p
k
t ε
k
t (n+1)) ∈
Q, and ξ < εkt (n+ 1) < ε(n). Let ε(n+ 1) = min{ε
k
t (n+ 1)|x
k
t = yn}.
This defines the sequence (εkt (n)) by induction. Note that ε
k
t (n + 1)/ε(n) < 1 for all n.
Let ξ¯ < 1 be such that εkt (n+ 1)/ε(n) < ξ¯.
For each k ∈ K and t ∈ T , let qkt = p
k
t ε
k
t (n), where n is such that x
k
t = yn. We claim that
the data (xk, qk)Kk=1 satisfy SA-EDU. Let γ
∗ be defined from (qk)Kk=1 in the same manner as
γˆ was defined from (pk)Kk=1.
For each pair ((k, t), (k′, t′)) with xkt > x
k′
t′ , if n andm are such that x
k
t = yn and x
k′
t′ = ym,
then n > m. By definition of ε,
εkt (n)
εk
′
t′ (m)
<
εkt (n)
ε(m)
< ξ¯ < 1.
Hence,
γ∗((k, t), (k′, t′)) = log
pkt ε
k
t (n)
pk
′
t′ ε
k′
t′ (m)
< log
pkt
pk
′
t′
+ log ξ¯ < log
pkt
pk
′
t′
= γˆ(xks , x
k′
t′ ).
Thus, for all t ∈ T ,
γ∗ · t ≤ γˆ · t ≤ 0,
as t ≥ 0 and the data (xk, pk)Kk=1 satisfy SA-EDU. Thus the data (x
k, qk)Kk=1 satisfy SA-EDU.
Finally, note that ξ < εkt (n) < 1 for all n and each k ∈ K, t ∈ T . So that by choosing ξ
close enough to 1 we can take the prices (qk) to be as close to (pk) as desired.
8.6 Proof of Lemma 7
Consider the system comprised by (2) and (3) in the proof of Lemma 5. Let A, B, and E
be constructed from the data as in the proof of Lemma 5. The difference with respect to
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Lemma 5 is that now the entries of A4 may not be rational. Note that the entries of E, B,
and Ai, i = 1, 2, 3 are rational.
Suppose, towards a contradiction, that there is no solution to the system comprised by (2)
and (3). Then, by the argument in the proof of Lemma 5 there is no solution to System S1.
Lemma 3 with F = R implies that there is a real vector (θ, η, pi) such that
θ · A+ η ·B + pi · E = 0 and η ≥ 0, pi > 0.
Recall that B4 = 0 and E4 = 1, so we obtain that θ · A4 + pi = 0.
Let (qk)Kk=1 be vectors of prices such that the dataset (x
k, qk)Kk=1 satisfies SA-EDU and
log qkt ∈ Q for all k and s. (Such (q
k)Kk=1 exists by Lemma 6.) Construct matrices A
′, B′, and
E ′ from this dataset in the same way as A, B, and E is constructed in the proof of Lemma 5.
Note that only the prices are different in (xk, qk) compared to (xk, pk). So E ′ = E, B′ = B
and A′i = Ai for i = 1, 2, 3. Since only prices q
k are different in this dataset, only A′4 may be
different from A4.
By Lemma 6, we can choose prices qk such that |θ · A′4 − θ · A4| < pi/2. We have shown
that θ ·A4 = −pi, so the choice of prices q
k guarantees that θ ·A′4 < 0. Let pi
′ = −θ ·A′4 > 0.
Note that θ ·A′i+η ·B
′
i+pi
′Ei = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3, as (θ, η, pi) solves system S2 for matrices
A, B and E, and A′i = Ai, B
′
i = Bi and Ei = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3. Finally, B4 = 0 so
θ · A′4 + η · B
′
4 + pi
′E4 = θ · A
′
4 + pi
′ = 0.
We also have that η ≥ 0 and pi′ > 0. Therefore θ, η, and pi′ constitute a solution S2 for
matrices A′, B′, and E ′.
Lemma 3 then implies that there is no solution to S1 for matrices A′, B′, and E ′. So there
is no solution to the system comprised by (2) and (3) in the proof of Lemma 5. However,
this contradicts Lemma 5 because the data (xk, qk) satisfies SA-EDU and log qkt ∈ Q for all
k = 1, . . . K and t = 1, . . . , T .
9 Proof of Theorem 1 (ii), (iii), and (iv)
In this section, we provide a proof of Theorem 1 (ii), (iii), and (iv). Since all the proofs are
similar, we give a detailed proof for (iv) and then explain how the proof for (iv) are different
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for the proofs for (ii) and (iii), if any.
Lemma 8. Let (xk, pk)Kk=1 be a dataset. The following statements are equivalent:
1. (xk, pk)Kk=1 is future biased QHD rational.
2. There are strictly positive numbers vkt , λ
k, β ≥ 1, and δ ∈ (0, 1], for t = 0, . . . , T and
k = 1, . . . , K, such that
vkt = λ
kpkt if t = 0,
βδtvkt = λ
kpkt if t > 0,
xkt > x
k′
t′ ⇒ v
k
t ≤ v
k′
t′ .
Proof. We shall prove that (1) implies (2). Let (xk, pk)Kk=1 be future biased QHD rational.
Let β ≥ 1, δ ∈ (0, 1], and u : R+ → R be as in the definition of future biased QHD rational
data. Then (see, for example, Theorem 28.3 of Rockafellar (1997)), there are numbers λk ≥ 0,
k = 1, . . . , K such that if we let
vkt =
λkpkt
βδt
if t > 0; vkt = λ
kpkt if t = 0
then vkt ∈ ∂u(x
k
t ) if x
k
t > 0, and there is w ∈ ∂u(x
k
t ) with v
k
t ≥ w if x
k
t = 0. In fact, it is easy
to see that λk > 0, and therefore vkt > 0.
By the concavity of u, and the consequent monotonicity of ∂u(xkt ) (see Theorem 24.8
of Rockafellar (1997)), if xkt > x
k′
t′ > 0, v
k
t ∈ ∂u(x
k
t ), and v
k′
t′ ∈ ∂u(x
k′
t′ ), then v
k
t ≤ v
k′
t′ . If
xkt > x
k′
t′ = 0, then w ∈ ∂u(x
k′
t′ ) with v
k′
t′ ≥ w. So v
k
t ≤ w ≤ v
k′
t′ .
In second place, we show that (2) implies (1). Suppose that the numbers vkt , λ
k, β, δ, for
t ∈ T and k ∈ K, are as in (2).
Enumerate the elements in X in increasing order:
y1 < y2 < . . . < yn
Let
y
i
= min{vkt : x
k
t = yi} and y¯i = max{v
k
t : x
k
t = yi}.
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Let zi = (yi + yi+1)/2, i = 1, . . . , n− 1; z0 = 0, and zn = yn + 1. Let f be a correspondence
defined as follows:
f(z) =


[y
i
, y¯i] if z = yi,
max{y¯i : z < yi} if yn > z and ∀i(z 6= yi),
y
n
/2 if yn < z.
By assumption of the numbers vkt , we have that, when y < y
′, v ∈ f(y) and v′ ∈ f(y′), then
v ≤ v′. Then the correspondence f is monotone and there is a concave function u for which
∂u = f (Theorem 24.8 of Rockafellar (1997)). Given that vkt > 0 all the elements in the
range of f are positive, and therefore u is strictly increasing.
Finally, for all (k, t), λkpkt /(βδ
t) = vkt ∈ ∂u(v
k
t ) if t > 0; λ
kpkt = v
k
t ∈ ∂u(v
k
t ) if t = 0
and therefore the first-order conditions to a maximum choice of x hold at xkt . Since u is
concave the first-order conditions are sufficient. The data is therefore future biased QHD
rational.
9.1 Necessity
Lemma 9. If a dataset (xk, pk)Kk=1 is future biased QHD rational, then it satisfies SA-F-
QHD..
Proof. Let (xk, pk)Kk=1 be future biased QHD rational, and let β ≥ 1, δ ∈ (0, 1], and u :
R+ → R be as in the definition of future biased QHD rational. By Lemma 8, there exists
a strictly positive solution vkt , λ
k, β, δ to the system in Statement (2) of Lemma 8 with
vkt ∈ ∂u(x
k
t ) when x
k
t > 0, and v
k
t ≥ w ∈ ∂u(x
k
t ) when x
k
t = 0. Moreover, v
k
t = λ
kpkt /D(t),
where
D(t) =
{
1 if t = 0,
βδt if t > 0.
Let (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)ni=1 be a sequence satisfying the four conditions in SA-F-QHD. Then x
ki
ti
>
x
k′
i
t′
i
. Suppose that x
k′
i
t′
i
> 0. Then, vkiti ∈ ∂u(x
ki
ti
) and v
k′
i
t′
i
∈ ∂u(x
k′
i
t′
i
). By the concavity of u, it
follows that vkiti ≤ v
k′
i
t′
i
(see Theorem 24.8 of Rockafellar (1997)). Similarly, if x
k′
i
t′
i
= 0, then
vkiti ∈ ∂u(x
ki
ti
) and v
k′
i
t′
i
≥ w ∈ ∂u(x
k′
i
t′
i
), so that vkiti ≤ v
k′
i
t′
i
.
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Therefore,
1 ≥
n∏
i=1
λkiD(t′i)p
ki
ti
λk
′
iD(ti)p
k′
i
t′
i
=
n∏
i=1
D(t′i)p
ki
ti
D(ti)p
k′
i
t′
i
=
β#{i:t
′
i
>0}−#{i:ti>0}
δ(
∑
ti−
∑
t′
i
)
n∏
i=1
pkiti
p
k′
i
t′
i
≥
n∏
i=1
pkiti
p
k′
i
t′
i
,
where the first equality holds by (4) of SA-F-QHD; and the numbers λk appear the same
number of times in the denominator as in the numerator of this product. Moreover, the last
inequality holds by (2) and (3) of SA-F-QHD; and hence
∑
ti ≥
∑
t′i, and #{i : t
′
i > 0} ≤
#{i : ti > 0}.
9.2 Sufficiency
Lemma 10. Let data (xk, pk)kk=1 satisfy SA-F-QHD. Suppose that log(p
k
t ) ∈ Q for all k and
t. Then there are numbers vkt , λ
k, β, δ, for t ∈ T and k ∈ K satisfying (2) in Lemma 8.
Lemma 11. Let data (xk, pk)kk=1 satisfy SA-F-QHD. Then for all positive numbers ε, there
exists qkt ∈ [p
k
t−ε, p
k
t ] for all t ∈ T and k ∈ K such that log q
k
t ∈ Q and the dataset (x
k, qk)kk=1
satisfy SA-F-QHD.
Lemma 12. Let data (xk, pk)kk=1 satisfy SA-F-QHD. Then there are numbers v
k
t , λ
k, β, δ,
for t ∈ T and k ∈ K satisfying (2) in Lemma 8.
Lemma 11 and 12 hold as in the previous section.
9.3 Proof of Lemma 10
We linearize the equation in System (2) of Lemma 8. The result is:
log v(xkt )− log λ
k − log pkt = 0 if t = 0, (5)
log v(xkt ) + log β + t log δ − log λ
k − log pkt = 0 if t > 0, (6)
x > x′ ⇒ log v(x′) ≥ log v(x), (7)
log β ≥ 0, (8)
log δ ≤ 0. (9)
In the system comprised by (5), (6) (7), (8) and (9), the unknowns are the real numbers
log vkt , log δ, k = 1, . . . , K and t = 1, . . . , T .
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First, we are going to write the system of inequalities (5), (6), and (7) in matrix form.
A system of linear inequalities
We shall define a matrix A such that there are positive numbers vkt , λ
k, β, δ the logs
of which satisfy Equation (2) if and only if there is a solution u ∈ RK×(T+1)+2+K+1 to the
system of equations
A · u = 0,
and for which the last component of u is strictly positive.
Let A be a matrix with K× (T +1) rows and K× (T +1)+1+K+1 columns, defined as
follows: We have one row for every pair (k, t); one column for every pair (k, t); two columns
for each k; and two additional columns. Organize the columns so that we first have the
K × (T + 1) columns for the pairs (k, t); then two columns, which we shall refer to as the
β-column and δ-column, respectively; then K columns (one for each k); and finally one
last column. In the row corresponding to (k, t) the matrix has zeroes everywhere with the
following exceptions: it has a 1 in the column for (k, t); it has a 1 if t > 0 and it has a 0
if t = 0 in the β column; it has a t in the δ column; it has a −1 in the column for k; and
− log pkt in the very last column.
Thus, matrix A looks as follows:


(1,1) ··· (k,t) (k,t′) ··· (K,T ) β δ 1 ··· k ··· K p
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
(k,t=0) 0 · · · 1 0 · · · 0 0 t 0 · · · −1 · · · 0 − log pkt
(k,t′>0) 0 · · · 0 1 · · · 0 1 t′ 0 · · · −1 · · · 0 − log pk
′
t′
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...


Consider the system A · u = 0. If there are numbers solving Equation (5), then these
define a solution u ∈ RK×(T+1)+2+K+1 for which the last component is 1. If, on the other
hand, there is a solution u ∈ RK×(T+1)+2+K+1 to the system A · u = 0 in which the last
component is strictly positive, then by dividing through by the last component of u we
obtain numbers that solve Equation (5).
In second place, we write the system of inequalities (7) in matrix form. Let B be a
matrix B with K× (T +1)+1+K+1 columns. Define B as follows: One row for every pair
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(k, t) and (k′, t′) with xkt > x
k′
t′ ; in the row corresponding to (k, t) and (k
′, t′) we have zeroes
everywhere with the exception of a −1 in the column for (k, t) and a 1 in the column for
(k′, t′) . Finally, we have last two rows, where we have zero everywhere with one exception.
In the first row, we have a 1 at K × (T + 1) + 1th column; in the second row, we have a
−1 at K × (T + 1) + 2th column. We shall refer to the first last row as the β-row, which
captures (8). We also shall refer to the second row as the δ-row, which captures (9).
(For present biased QHD, we have −1 instead of 1 in β column. For general QHD, we
do not have β row.)
In third place, we have a matrix E that captures the requirement that the last component
of a solution be strictly positive. The matrix E has a single row and K× (T +1)+2+K+1
columns. It has zeroes everywhere except for 1 in the last column.
To sum up, there is a solution to system (5), (7), (8), and (9) if and only if there is a
vector u ∈ RK×(T+1)+2+K+1 that solves the system of equations and linear inequalities
S1 :


A · u = 0,
B · u ≥ 0,
E · u≫ 0.
Theorem of the Alternative
The entries of A, B, and E are integer numbers, with the exception of the last column of
A. Under the hypothesis of the lemma we are proving, the last column consists of rational
numbers.
By Lemma 4, then, there is such a solution u to S1 if and only if there is no vector
(θ, η, pi) that solves the system of equations and linear inequalities
S2 :


θ · A+ η ·B + pi · E = 0,
η ≥ 0,
pi > 0.
In the following, we shall prove that the non-existence of a solution u implies that the
data must violate SA-EDU. Suppose then that there is no solution u and let (θ, η, pi) be a
rational vector as above, solving system S2.
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By multiplying (θ, η, pi) by any positive integer we obtain new vectors that solve S2, so
we can take (θ, η, pi) to be integer vectors.
Henceforth, we use the following notational convention: For a matrix D with K × (T +
1) + 2 + K + 1 columns, write D1 for the submatrix of D corresponding to the first K ×
(T + 1) columns; let D2 be the submatrix corresponding to the following one column (i.e.,
β-column); let D3 be the submatrix corresponding to the following one column (i.e., δ-
column); D4 correspond to the next K columns; and D5 to the last column. Thus, D =
[D1 D2 D3 D4 D5].
Claim 9. (i) θ ·A1+η ·B1 = 0; (ii) θ ·A2+η ·B2 = 0; (iii) θ ·A3+η ·B3 = 0; (iv) θ ·A4 = 0;
and (v) θ · A5 + pi · E5 = 0.
Proof. Since θ · A + η · B + pi · E = 0, then θ · Ai + η · Bi + pi · Ei = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , 5.
Moreover, since B4, B5, E1, E2, E3, and E4 are zero matrices, we obtain the claim. 
For convenience, we transform the matrices A and B using θ and η.
Transform the matrices A and B
Lets define a matrix A∗ from A by letting A∗ have the same number of columns as A and
including
1. θr copies of the rth row when θr > 0;
2. omitting row r when θr = 0;
3. and θr copies of the rth row multiplied by −1 when θr < 0.
We refer to rows that are copies of some r with θr > 0 as original rows, and to those that
are copies of some r with θr < 0 as converted rows.
Similarly, we define the matrix B∗ from B by including the same columns as B and ηr
copies of each row (and thus omitting row r when ηr = 0; recall that ηr ≥ 0 for all r).
Claim 10. For any (k, t), all the entries in the column for (k, t) in A∗1 are of the same sign.
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Proof. By definition of A, the column for (k, t) will have zero in all its entries with the
exception of the row for (k, t). In A∗, for each (k, t), there are three mutually exclusive
possibilities: the row for (k, t) in A can (i) not appear in A∗, (ii) it can appear as original,
or (iii) it can appear as converted. This shows the claim.
Claim 11. There exists a sequence of pairs (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)n
∗
i=1 that satisfies (1) in SA-EDU.
Proof. We define such a sequence by induction. Let B1 = B∗. Given Bi, define Bi+1 as
follows.
Denote by >i the binary relation on X defined by z >i z′ if z > z′ and there is at least
one pair (k, t) and (k′, t′) for which (i) xkt > x
k′
t′ ; (ii) z = x
k
t and z
′ = xk
′
t′ ; and (iii) the row
corresponding xkt > x
k′
t′ in B has strictly positive weight in η.
The binary relation >i cannot exhibit cycles because >i⊆>. There is therefore at least
one sequence zi1, . . . z
i
Li
in X such that zij >
i zij+1 for all j = 1, . . . , Li − 1 and with the
property that there is no z ∈ X with z >i zi1 or z
i
Li
>i z.
Let the matrix Bi+1 be defined as the matrix obtained from Bi by omitting one copy of
the row corresponding to zij > z
i
j+1, for all j = 1, . . . Li − 1.
The matrix Bi+1 has strictly fewer rows than Bi. There is therefore n∗ for which Bn
∗+1
either has no more rows, or Bn
∗+1
1 has only zeroes in all its entries (its rows are copies of the
δ-row which has only zeroes in its first K × (T + 1) columns).
Define a sequence of pairs (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)n
∗
i=1 by letting x
ki
ti
= zi1 and x
k′
i
t′
i
= ziLi . Note that, as a
result, xkiti > x
k′
i
t′
i
for all i. Therefore the sequence of pairs (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)n
∗
i=1 satisfies condition (1)
in SA-EDU. 
We shall use the sequence of pairs (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)n
∗
i=1 as our candidate violation of SA-EDU.
Consider a sequence of matrices Ai, i = 1, . . . , n∗ defined as follows. Let A1 = A∗,
B1 = B∗, and
C1 =
[
A1
B1
]
.
Observe that the rows of C1 add to the null vector by Claim 9.
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We shall proceed by induction. Suppose that Ai has been defined, and that the rows of
C i =
[
Ai
Bi
]
add to the null vector.
Recall the definition of the sequence
xkiti = z
i
1 > . . . > z
i
Li
= x
k′
i
t′
i
.
There is no z ∈ X with z >i zi1 or z
i
Li
>i z, so in order for the rows of C i to add to zero
there must be a −1 in Ai1 in the column corresponding to (k
′
i, t
′
i) and a 1 in A
i
1 in the column
corresponding to (ki, ti). Let ri be a row in A
i corresponding to (ki, ti), and r
′
i be a row
corresponding to (k′i, t
′
i). The existence of a −1 in A
i
1 in the column corresponding to (k
′
i, t
′
i),
and a 1 in Ai1 in the column corresponding to (ki, ti), ensures that ri and r
′
i exist. Note that
the row r′i is a converted row while ri is original. Let A
i+1 be defined from Ai by deleting
the two rows, ri and r
′
i.
Claim 12. The sum of ri, r
′
i, and the rows of B
i which are deleted when forming Bi+1
(corresponding to the pairs zij > z
i
j+1, j = 1, . . . , Li − 1) add to the null vector.
Proof. Recall that zij >
i zij+1 for all j = 1, . . . , Li− 1. So when we add the rows correspond-
ing to zij >
i zij+1 and z
i
j+1 >
i zij+2, then the entries in the column for (k, t) with x
k
t = z
i
j+1
cancel out and the sum is zero in that entry. Thus, when we add the rows of Bi that are
not in Bi+1 we obtain a vector that is 0 everywhere except the columns corresponding to zi1
and ziLi . This vector cancels out with ri + r
′
i, by definition of ri and r
′
i. 
Claim 13. The matrix A∗ can be partitioned into pairs of rows as follows:
A∗ =


r1
r′1
...
ri
r′i
...
rn∗
r′n∗ ,


in which the rows r′i are converted and the rows ri are original.
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Proof. For each i, Ai+1 differs from Ai in that the rows ri and r
′
i are removed from A
i to
form Ai+1. We shall prove that A∗ is composed of the 2n∗ rows ri, r
′
i.
First note that since the rows of C i add up to the null vector, and Ai+1 and Bi+1 are
obtained from Ai and Bi by removing a collection of rows that add up to zero, then the rows
of C i+1 must add up to zero as well.
By way of contradiction, suppose that there exist rows left after removing rn∗ and r
′
n∗ .
Then, by the argument above, the rows of the matrix Cn
∗+1 must add to the null vector. If
there are rows left, then the matrix Cn
∗+1 is well defined.
By definition of the sequence Bi, however, Bn
∗+1 has all its entries equal to zero, or has
no rows. Hence, the rows remaining in An
∗+1
1 must add up to zero. By Claim 10, the entries
of a column (k, t) of A∗ are always of the same sign. Moreover, each row of A∗ has a non-zero
element in the first K × S columns. Therefore, no subset of the columns of A∗1 can sum to
the null vector. 
Claim 14. (i) For any k and t, if (ki, ti) = (k, t) for some i, then the row ri corresponding
to (k, t) appears as original in A∗. Similarly, if (k′i, t
′
i) = (k
′, t′) for some i, then the row
corresponding to (k, t) appears converted in A∗.
(ii) If the row corresponding to (k, t) appears as original in A∗, then there is some i with
(ki, ti) = (k, t). Similarly, if the row corresponding to (k, t) appears converted in A
∗, then
there is i with (k′i, t
′
i) = (k, t).
Proof. (i) is true by definition of (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
). (ii) is immediate from Claim 13 because if the
row corresponding to (k, t) appears original in A∗ then it equals ri for some i, and then
xkt = x
ki
ti
. Similarly when the row appears converted. 
Claim 15. The sequence (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)n
∗
i=1 satisfies (2), (3), and (4) in SA-EDU.
Proof. We first establish (2). Note that A∗3 is a vector, and in row r the entry of A
∗
3 is as
follows. There must be a (k, t) of which r is a copy. Then the component at row r of A∗3 is
t if r is original and −t if r is converted. Now, when r appears as original there is some i
for which t = ti, when r appears as converted there is some i for which t = t
′
i. So for each r
there is i such that (A∗3)r is either ti or −t
′
i.
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By Claim 9 (iii), θ · A3 + η · B3 = 0. Recall that θ · A3 equals the sum of the rows of
A∗3. Moreover, B3 is a vector that has zeroes everywhere except a −1 in the δ row (i.e.,
K × (T + 1) + 2th row). Therefore, the sum of the rows of A∗3 equals ηK×(T+1)+2, where
ηK×(T+1)+2 is theK×(T+1)+2th element of η. Since η ≥ 0, therefore,
∑
i:ti>0
ti−
∑
i:t′
i
>0 t
′
i =
ηK×(T+1)+2 ≥ 0, and condition (2) in the axiom is satisfied.
Next, we show (3). By Claim 9 (ii), θ · A2 + η · B2 = 0. Recall that θ · A2 equals the
sum of the rows of A∗2. Moreover, B2 is a vector that has zeroes everywhere except a 1
in the β row (i.e., K × (T + 1) + 1th row). Therefore, the sum of the rows of A∗2 equals
ηK×(T+1)+1, where ηK×(T+1)+1 is the K × (T + 1) + 1th element of η. Since η ≥ 0, therefore,
−#{i : ti > 0}+#{i : t
′
i > 0} = ηK×(T+1)+1 ≥ 0, and condition (3) in the axiom is satisfied.
(For present biased QHDU, B2 is a vector that has zeroes everywhere except a −1 in the
β row (i.e., K × (T + 1) + 1th row). Hence, #{i : ti > 0} −#{i : t
′
i > 0} = ηK×(T+1)+1 ≥ 0,
and condition (3) in present biased QHDU is satisfied. For general QHDU, B2 is a zero
vector in the β row (i.e., K × (T + 1) + 1th row). Hence, #{i : ti > 0} −#{i : t
′
i > 0} = 0,
and condition (3) in general biased QHDU is satisfied.)
Now we turn to (4). By Claim 9 (iv), the rows of A∗4 add up to zero. Therefore, the num-
ber of times that k appears in an original row equals the number of times that it appears in
a converted row. By Claim 14, then, the number of times k appears as ki equals the number
of times it appears as k′i. Therefore condition (4) in the axiom is satisfied. 
Finally, in the following, we show that
n∗∏
i=1
pkiti
p
k′
i
t′
i
> 1,
which finishes the proof of Lemma 5 as the sequence (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)n
∗
i=1 would then exhibit a
violation of SA-EDU.
Claim 16.
∏n∗
i=1
p
ki
ti
p
k′
i
t′
i
> 1.
Proof. By Claim 9 (iv) and the fact that the submatrix E4 equals the scalar 1, we obtain
0 = θ · A4 + piE4 = (
n∗∑
i=1
(ri + r
′
i))4 + pi,
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where (
∑n∗
i=1(ri+r
′
i))4 is the (scalar) sum of the entries of A
∗
4. Recall that − log p
ki
ti
is the last
entry of row ri and that log p
k′
i
t′
i
is the last entry of row r′i, as r
′
i is converted and ri original.
Therefore the sum of the rows of A∗4 are
∑n∗
i=1 log(p
k′
i
t′
i
/pkiti ). Then,
n∗∑
i=1
log(p
k′
i
t′
i
/pkiti ) = −pi < 0.
Thus
n∗∏
i=1
pkiti
p
k′
i
t′
i
> 1.

9.4 GTD and MTD
The proof that GTD rational is equivalent to SA-GTD is identical to the result in Echenique
and Saito (2013a). One simply needs to interpret states in Echenique and Saito (2013a) as
time periods. The GTD model is then the same as the subjective expected utility model.
The proof that SA-MTD es equivalent to MTD rationality requires the following modi-
fication of he argument in Echenique and Saito (2013a).
To see that SA-MGTD is necessary, let (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)ni=1 under the conditions of the axiom.
The first-order condition is D(t)u′(xkt ) = λ
kpt. Then
1 ≥
n∏
i=1
u′(xkiti )
u′(x
k′
i
t′
i
)
=
n∏
i=1
λkiD(t′i)p
ki
ti
λk
′
iD(ti)p
k′
i
t′
i
=
n∏
i=1
D(t′i)p
ki
ti
D(ti)p
k′
i
t′
i
=
n∏
i=1
D(t′i)
D(ti)
n∏
i=1
pkiti
p
k′
i
t′
i
=
n∏
i=1
D(t′pi(i))
D(ti)
n∏
i=1
pkiti
p
k′
i
t′
i
.
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Since ti ≥ t
′
pi(i) and D is decreasing it follows that
D(t′pi(i))
D(ti)
≥ 1.
Therefore we must have that
n∏
i=1
pkiti
p
k′
i
t′
i
.
To see that it is sufficient, consider the following. We need to add rows to B to reflect
that D(t′) ≥ D(t) when t ≥ t′. In the solution to the dual, we follow the steps of the
proof until we construct a regular sequence (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)ni=1. Such a sequence corresponds to a
decomposition of A∗ into pairs of rows (ri, r
′
i)
n
i=1 in which ri is original and r
′
i is reversed.
Now consider the row corresponding to t. The rows of B are no longer all zero in the
column for B. The sum of the rows of A∗ + B∗ equal zero. As usual we can eliminate pairs
of rows of B such that 1t′ − 1t + 1t − 1t′′ = 1t′ − 1t′′ . So in the matrix B
∗ all the entries in
the column for t will be of the same sign. Let us say that they are all −11. Since the rows
of A∗ +B∗ is zero, the number of times that t appears in an original row minus the number
of times that t appears in a reversed row equals the number of rows in B∗ in which t has a
−1. For each such row ρ of B∗ there is some t(ρ) in which B∗ has a 1, so t(ρ) ≤ t. We have
assumed that there are only −1 in B∗ in t so the number of reversed rows must be fewer
than the number of original rows in which t is a part. For each such reversed row r′i let pi(i)
be one (distinct) original row in which t appears. Thus ti = tpi for such i. This exhausts all
the reversed rows, and there may be some original rows that are not the image of pi.
For each of these original rows ri, there is a corresponding ρi in B
∗ with an entry of
−1 in column t. Let r′j be a reversed row in whys t(ρi) appears (reversed rows must here
exceed original rows, since the entries in B∗ column t(ρi) are positive). Let pi(i) = j. Then
ti ≥ t(ρi) = tpi.
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